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SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE FELA
ACTIONS-THE CONVERSE OF THE ERIE PROBLEM?'
ALFRED HILL
The courts of the several states are obliged to take jurisdiction of
actions brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act' when their
"ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the
occasion and is invoked in conformity to those laws."2 Since actions
brought under the Act are essentially actions in common law negligence,
3
suitable state courts can invariably be found and their jurisdiction is com-
monly invoked. It has often been said that the state courts are free to
follow their own procedure in such cases,4 although of course they are
bound to follow federal law in substantive matters.
In earlier times the courts employed the terms substance and pro-
cedure (and often still do) as if they had acquired an immutable meaning
in the law. In recent years it has become increasingly clear that the courts
should not and indeed do not apply standards of substance and procedure
which are invariably the same in all legal contexts.' Particularly conspicu-
ous has been the development in the federal district courts in consequence
of Erie KR. v. Tompkins6 and its progeny-a development which has
produced standards of substance and procedure radically different from
those which have become familiar in the conflict of laws.' Two recent
cases in the Supreme Court have induced speculation as to whether a
development corresponding to Erie is taking place on the state court level
in FELA actions and perhaps in all actions involving the assertion of
t This phper has been submitted to the Harvard Law Scbool in partial fulfill-
ment of the dissertation requirement for the S.J.D. Degree. The author acknowl-
edges with appreciation that he was assisted in its preparation by a research grant
from the Southwestern Legal Foundation.
-*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; Visiting Professor of
Law, Northwestern University, 1956-57.
1 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S. C. Sec. 51-60 (1952).
2 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912).
3 See New Orleans & N.E. R.R. v. Harris, 24-7 U.S. 367, 371 (1918). This
is so even though the Act has removed certain common law defenses. See, e.g.,
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
4 E.g., Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511 (1915) ; Minneapolis
& St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Dickenson v. Stiles, 246 U.S.
631 (1918).
5 See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of La~ws, 42 YALE
L.J. 333 (1923) ; Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance and Procedure"
after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. RaV. 271 (1939). Thus the consid-
erations that may save a retroactive criminal statute from invalidation on ex post
facto grounds, on the theory that it deals only with "procedural" matters, are not
necessarily the same as those which determine how far foreign law shall be applied
in order to give effect to a foreign contract. See Cook, supra, at 341-42.
6304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7 Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondi'ersity Litigation, 69 HARY.
L. REv. 66, 71-72 (1955).
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federally-created rights. In Brown v. Western R.R. of Alabama8 a state
court was reversed, apparently for the reason that it required excessive
particularity in the pleading of an FELA action, although the circum-
stances were such that a similarly strict pleading requirement in respect
to a cause of action arising in another state probably would have been
sustained. In Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R.9 a state court was reversed
for not granting a jury trial on an issue of fraud in an FELA case,
although, again, similar action in respect to a cause of action arising in
another state probably would have been sustained. As will be seen, these
two cases are only recent manifestations of a development which in fact
has been taking place for a considerable time.
In the conflict of laws the need to draw a distinction between sub-
stance and procedure is inevitable. While there is universal acceptance
of the principle that a controversy should be resolved in accordance with
the law of the foreign locus,"0 the belief is also universal that it is neither
feasible nor desirable for the courts of the forum to attempt to resolve
the controversy in a setting in which the foreign law is followed to the
last detail of judicial administration." Hence a line needs to be drawn
between the "procedural" area in which the forum applies its own law
and the "substantive" area in which it applies the foreign law, and this
line is differently drawn in different systems of conflict of laws." It is
manifest that such a line also needs to be drawn when state-created rights
are asserted in a federal court or federally-created rights are asserted in
a state court.
In the conflict of laws (and this term is used here with reference
to the problems of applying law which is foreign in a territorial sense),
the American development of the substance-procedure dichotomy has
been dominated by a formula which classifies as substantive the rules pre-
scribing the legal consequences of established facts, and as procedural the
rules prescribing how and under what circumstances the facts are to be
established. 12 Hence it is that such matters as burden of proof, presump-
tions, and sometimes even statutes of frauds, are deemed procedural.'"
Owing to this method of classification, the system sometimes permits the
resolution of a controversy in a way diametrically opposed to the way
8 338 U.S. 294 (1949). See, e.g., 2 STAN. L. REV. 594 (1950); 2 ALA. L. REV.
366 (1953) ; 11 U. PiTT. L. REV. 492 (1950).
9 342 U.S. 359 (1952). See, e.g., 31 TEXAS L. REV. 218 (1952); 4 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 171 (1952); 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 788 (1952); U. ILL. L. FORUM 297
(1952); 37 CORNELL L. Q. 799 (1952); 30 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 364 (1952).
10 A more apt term less commonly employed would be the lex causae.
11 See Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Coi.um. L.
REV. 959 (1952) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFL!CT OF LAWS, c. 12, Introductory Note
(1934).
"aE.g., 2 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 276-86 (1947).
12See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 134-35 (2d ed. 1951), for a statement
of the classic rule and a warning against its misuse.
1ld. at 13747.
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it would have been resolved in the foreign locus, or permits the probable
outcome of the controversy to be affected by subjecting one or the other
of the parties to a substantial burden or bestowing upon him a substantial
advantage-and this without the justification that such a course is dictated
by significant considerations of local convenience or local policy.14.
The system is not static. However, such progress as is being made
toward a classification of substance and procedure which tends to give
more realistic effect to rights claimed under foreign law is necessarily
erratic, since the forty-eight states are apparently free to evolve inde-
pendent conflict rules without interference from the Supreme Court save
in particularly aberrational cases. 5 The Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires adherence to the statutes of another state only when they are
"substantive,"'" and even then does not require adherence in the face
of a contrary local policy supported by local contacts with the trans-
action.' 7 If the foreign law involved is non-statutory, it needs to be
followed, in general, only if the failure to do so would be so irrational
or unfair as to be a denial of due process."8 Even where the forum has
no contact with the controversy save as forum, an unusual classification
of a particular rule as procedural is apparently entitled to respect as a
"local policy," 19 except in an extreme case. 20
In the post-Erie period there has been a striking departure from
the substance-procedure dichotomy of the conflict of laws in cases in the
federal courts involving the assertion of state-created rights. Here the
policy has been established that, at least when jurisdiction is founded on
diversity of citizenship, the federal district courts shall strive for an
outcome of the litigation identical with the probable outcome in the
courts of the state where they sit.2 The policy is one which puts a higher
value upon conformity between federal and state courts sitting within a
14 Students of the conflict of laws have been sharply critical of this practice.
See authorities collected in Hill, supra note 7, at 72 n. 31.
15 See Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581
(1953).
161d. at 593.
17 E.g., Atlantic Packers Assoc. v. Industrial Acc. Com. of Calif., 294 U.S.
532 (1935).
18E.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). Cf. GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 31-32 (3d ed. 1949).
19 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 498 (1941). In
this case the trial was in Delaware, which was also the place where one of the
parties had incorporated. It is clear from the opinion, however, that the Court
was concerned only with the regard due to the "policy" of the forum qua forum.
The assumed posture of Delaware law concerning damages, which Judge Goodrich
had thought to be contrary to the "better view," 115 F. 2d 268, 275 (3d
Cir. 1940), but which the Supreme Court held to represent a valid local policy,
was found upon later examination not to represent the Delaware law at all.
See 125 F. 2d 820 (1942).
2
°John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
21 See note 7 supra.
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single state-and the consequent diminution of forum-shopping within
such state-than it puts upon conformity with the probable outcome in
the courts of the state where the cause of action arose. Whether or not
this policy is an inexorable requirement of the Constitution, and the
Supreme Court has recently intimated that it is,' the main thrust of the
policy is clear enough, and the consequence has been a marked shift in
the line between substance and procedure in the cases in which the policy
is operative. A number of state rules which have traditionally been re-
garded as procedural in the conflict of laws sense must now be followed
by the federal courts because they are "outcome-determinative:" e.g.,
statute of limitations, burden of proof, and conflict of laws rules. A
major reclassification is in full swing, and many crucial problems are
still unresolved.2"
Somewhat different considerations are involved when federally-
created rights are enforced in the state courts. Litigation based upon a
cause of action specifically created by Congress, as in the case of the
FELA, or the Jones Act,2 4 or the Securities Act of 1933,2' represents only
one aspect of the problem. A federally-created right may also be asserted
as a defense in an action brought to enforce a state-created right, as
where a contract is claimed to be void because in violation of the federal
anti-trust laws.2" Or state action may be attacked both on state and federal
grounds, as where a state rate order is claimed to be invalid under the
state and federal constitutions.27 In all these instances the cardinal con-
sideration is federal paramountcy; once the extent of the federal right is
establi.hed there is no room for the operation of local policy, as contrasted
with the scope afforded to local policy in the conflict of laws. Moreover,
federal paramountcy extends as much to procedural as to substantive
matters; if the federal purpose is clear, and if it is valid, there is no
room for local procedural autonomy as there is in the conflict of laws,
and this is true whether the federal purpose is evidenced by an express
Congressional enactment of a "procedural" character or is reasonably
inferable from the substantive federal right in issue. Combined with these
factors there has been a judicial tendency, more evident in recent than
in earlier times, to ascribe to Congress an intention that federally-created
rights shall receive uniform enforcement throughout the land notwith-
standing the concurrent responsibility of the state courts in such enforce-
ment. These factors in combination led the Supreme Court, long before
Erie, to impose upon the state courts rules which are in some respects.
22 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U. S. 193 (1956).
23 See, e.g., HART AND ",ECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SySTm 659-60 (1935) ; Note, State Trial Procedure and the Federal Courts: Evi-
dence, Juries, and Directed J'erdicts under the Erie Doctrine, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1516 (1953).
2441 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S. C. See. 688 (1952).
254S Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. See. 77a (1952), as amended.
26 See Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
27 See Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
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similar to the "outcome-determinative" rules which have become familiar
since Erie, and this development has been particularly pronounced in
FELA cases. However these two developments have in some respects been
dissimilar, which can hardly be surprising in view of the different back-
grounds from which they have emerged.2" Recognition of the differences
in these two developments can contribute to the better understanding
of each.
The point by point analysis below is concerned chiefly with FELA
cases, but this is because, as has been indicated, the evolution of the new
substance-procedure dichotomy has been evidenced chiefly in such cases.
Indeed there is ground for believing that some of the rules being evolved
in the FELA cases should not at this time be extended to broader areas.
Burden of proof. The term burden of proof is indiscriminately
employed by most courts to convey two different meanings. One of these
is the burden of producing sufficient evidence to forestall a peremptory
ruling for the opponent, such as a directed verdict or the sustaining of
a demurrer to the evidence. This burden may shift during the course of
the trial. Thus if the plaintiff discharges his burden of proving a prima
facie case, the burden may shift to the defendant of producing evidence
in denial, or in support of an affirmative defense; if the defendant proves
an affirmative defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff of producing
evidence to overcome it. The other aspect of burden of proof is the
burden of persuasion. If sufficient evidence has been produced on both
sides to create a genuine issue of fact and to warrant submission of the
case to the trier of the facts, which may or may not be a jury, the trier
of the facts is supposed to make its determination in the light of the fact
that the one party or the other bears the burden of persuasion. While the
burden 'f producing evidence may shift from time to time during the
course of the trial, the burden of persuasion is usually constant, devolving
ordinarily upon the party who has sought to establish the affirmative side
of any proposition.2" In both senses, burden of proof is usually deemed
procedural in the conflict of laws."0 In both senses, it has been held by
the Supreme Court to be outcome-determinative for Erie purposes.3"
In Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 2 an FELA case instituted in a
state court in Vermont, the contention was made that the jury should
28 In a brief reference to the problem in an earlier paper the writer stressed
the similarities without taking account of the important differences. Hill, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 107. Also see 2 STAN. L. REV. 594 (1950).
29 9 WIGMORIE ON EVDENCE 266 et seq. (3d ed. 190); McCoRMIcK oN EvI-
DENCE 635 et seq. (1954). The one who bears the burden of persuasion may also
be said to bear the risk of non-persuasion. WIGMORE, supra, at 270-74, prefers
the latter usage.
30 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 13741 (2d ed. 1951).
31 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 303 U.S. 208 (1939) (burden of producing
evidence) ; Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116-17 (19+3) (burden of per-
suasion).
32238 U.S. 507 (1915)
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have been instructed, in accordance with Vermont practice, that the
burden was on the plaintiff to prove freedom from contributory negli-
gence. The traditional federal rule in negligence cases in this pre-Erie
period was that the defendant had the burden of proving contributory
negligence. Holding the Vermont rule inapplicable, the Supreme Court
said that the question involved was not "a mere matter of procedure as
to the time when and the order in which evidence should be submitted."133
While the burden of persuasion was actually in issue in the case, the
Court seems to have been thinking primarily in terms of the burden of
producing evidence. Thus the reasoning of the Court was, in effect, that
if one jurisdiction permits a plaintiff to recover if he establishes facts A
and B, and another jurisdiction permits the plaintiff to recover only if
he establishes facts A, B, and C, the rule which requires the plaintiff to
establish (or which excuses him from establishing) fact C is not really
procedural but "part of the very substance" 34 of his case. Such an analysis
would be more apt where the existence or non-existence of fact C pro-
duces different legal consquences in the two jurisdictions. But, as Pro-
fessor Morgan has pointed out, 5 the existence or non-existence of
contributory negligence, once established, had precisely the same legal
effect in the Vermont courts and in the federal courts. Thus the difference
between the two jurisdictions was not over the peculiar combination of
facts which entitled one party to judgment against the other, but over
the conditions governing the establishment of such facts, and the Court
was not persuasive as to the reasons which make some of such conditions
more "substantive" than others.
The Court further observed that the federal rule placing upon the
defendant the burden of proving contributory negligence was one that
the federal courts had uniformly followed as a matter of "general
law."3 This does not mean that the rule involved had uniformly been
regarded as "substantive." It was a common practice of the federal courts
during the pre-Erie period to resort to "general law" on non-statutory
questions irrespective of whether they were thought to be substantive or
procedural; 3" indeed, in its opinion in the Central Vermont Ry. case the
Court also used the term "general law" with respect to matters that it
plainly regarded as procedural. 8 So here too one does not find a per-
suasive basis for the decision. But requiring the state court to follow a
federal rule which had so obvious a bearing on the chances of recovery
did make sense in terms of the uniform application of the federal statute,
33Id. at 511-12.
34 Id. at 512.
3r Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L. Rav. 153, 187 n.
85 (1944).
36 238 U.S. 507 at 512.
37 See Hill, oP. cit. supra note 7, at 83-85.
38238 U.S. 507 at 513, 515.
39 Id. at 512.
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and also in terms of a rationally inferable legislative intent, as the Court
in fact indicated.39
In later cases arising under other federal statutes, the Court held
that federal law determined the burden of producing evidence in support
of an affirmative federal defense, 40 and more recently the Court estab-
lished somewhat elaborate federal standards governing shifts in the
burden of producing evidence where a negative defense is interposed to
a federal claim.4 The cases also reveal an increasing tendency to formu-
late "burden of proof" rules which accord with the basic purposes of
the substantive federal policy being executed,42 and which tend to give
these policies a substantially "uniform application." 43 The cases usually
talk of burden of proof without regard to which of its two components is
involved, and there has been no broad declaration by the Supreme Court
from which it could fairly be inferred that substantive effect is to be
given to burden of proof in all its aspects. For that matter it is not yet
clear that substantive effect is to be given to all aspects of burden of proof
even in Erie-type cases.44 In general the area is one where precedents on
one level (federal enforcement of state law) may afford helpful anal-
ogies on the second (state enforcement of federal law), and vice versa.
But regard must always be had for the fact that precedents on the state
level may. be peculiarly determined by considerations of specific Con-
gressional intent or the effectuation of broad federal policy--considera-
tions not similarly applicable in Erie-type situations.
Presumptions and Res Ipsa Loquitur: At the outset it may be noted
40 Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 (1923) (discharge in bankruptcy); cf. Garrett
v. Moore-McCormick Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (admiralty).
41 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-88 (1946).
This suit, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, was brought in a federal district
court rather than in a state court, but in view of the fact that the Supreme Court
grounded its holding on what it deemed to be legislative intent there is every
reason to believe that this aspect of the case is binding on the state courts, and a
number of state courts have so construed it. Katchel v. Northern Engraving &
Mfg. Co., 249 Wis. 583, 25 N.W. 2d 431 (1946); Sherman v. Coastal Cities Coach
Co., 4 N.J. Super. 288, 66 A. 2d 894 (1949).
42 Hill v. Smith, supra note 40; Garret v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra note
40. Cf. American Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U. S. 19 (1923).
43 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra note 40, at 244. Cf. Brady v.
Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 579 1943).
44 Even in Central Vermont Ry. v. White, supra note 32, at 511-12, the Court,
as has already been observed, seemed to assume that certain aspects of the burden
of producing evidence were procedural. Professor McCormick thinks that the
burden of producing evidence is of special significance for the outcome of a
trial, but regards the burden of persuasion as a verbal formula which in most
instances has little practical effect on juries. McConuIcK ON EVIDENCE 685-86
(1954). His colleague Professor Stumberg seems to entertain generally contrary
views. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 156-57 (2d ed. 1951). Compare 5 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE, Para. 43.08 (2d ed. 1951) with Note, supra note 23, at 1518-19.




that if the operation of a so-called presumption is conclusive-if the
acknowledged proof of fact A establishes the existence of fact B irrespec-
tive of the weight of evidence to the contrary-what is involved is not
truly a presumption but a rule of substantive law which is usually given
substantive effect in the conflict of laws.45 Sometimes proof of fact A is
deemed to constitute such strong evidence of the existence of fact B as
to warrant peremptory disposition of this issue by the court unless the
opposing party produces evidence in rebuttal from which the non-
existence of fact B may reasonably be inferred. This is the only type of
presumption recognized by some writers." Sometimes the existence of
fact A is deemed sufficiently strong evidence of the existence of fact B
to warrant an inference that fact B exists but not such strong evidence
that a contrary finding by the trier of facts would be wrong as a matter
of law; upon proof of fact A the opposing party may, but need not,
produce evidence concerning the non-existence of fact B-the burden
of producing evidence does not shift. Some call this merely a permissive
inference, and others call it a permissive presumption; 4" it will be given
the latter designation for present purposes. Res ipsa loquitur, as given
effect in most jurisdictions, is an example of such a permissive presump-
tior,.48 In the case of the mandatory as distinct from the permissive pre-
sumption there is much disagreement as to the help it affords to the
favored party once the other party produces rebutting evidence.49 In
general presumptions are treated as procedural in the conflict of laws."0
In Erie-type situations the tendency is to treat them as outcome-
determinative. 51
Because the mandatory type of presumption is in large measure a
provision governing the producing of evidence, it is not surprising that
such rules were given substantive effect in FELA cases almost as soon
as "burden of proof" was given substantive effect. The first of these
cases, New Orleans & N.E.R.R. v. Harris,"2 involved a Mississippi
statute which provided that proof of injury caused by a railroad should
be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad. On
45 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 238 (5d ed. 1949).
46 See Ray, Presumptions and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 33 TEXAS L.
REV. 588, 589 (1955).
471d. at 589-90.
4 8 Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REv.
241, 24547 (1936).
49Ray, op. cit. supra note 46, at 591-96.
GO BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1610-11 (1935).
51 Cf. Sylvania v. Electric Products v. Barker, 228 F. 2d 842, 848-50 (1st
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956) ; Mark v. City of Ormond Beach,
113 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Fla. 1953); United States v. Davis, 125 F. Supp. 696
(W.D. Ark. 1954); Herr v. Holohan, 131 F. Supp. 777, 779-80 (D. Md. 1955);
Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F. 2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied
342 U.S. 945 (1952) (res ipsa loquitur); Hamilton v. Southern Ry., 162 F. 2d
884, 886 (4th Cir. 1947) (same).
52247 U.S. 367 (1917).
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the basis of this statute the trial court imposed upon the railroad the
burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion as to non-
negligence. The Supreme Court, citing Central Vermont Ry. v. White,
held the Mississippi statute inapplicable on the ground that "burden of
proof is a matter of substance and not subject to control by laws of the
several States."53 This case is typical of others in which state presump-
tions have been rejected in FELA cases on the theory that federal oc-
cupation of the field left no room for the operation of local rules which
the Supreme Court thought to be more than merely "procedural." 5 4
Moreover the state courts have long deemed themselves bound to follow
the federal standard of res ipsa loquitur in FELA cases, although until
recently this standard was difficult of ascertainment. 5  It is now clear
as a matter of federal law that res ipsa loquitur involves a presumption
which is only permissive.5" But it is obvious that this presumption may
be of crucial aid to the plaintiff even if the defendant does not risk a
peremptory ruling by his failure to produce rebutting evidence. Res ipsa
loquitur is thus a clear example of an outcome-determinative rule, as the
inferior federal courts have recognized in Erie-type cases."'a Of course
where a federal statute creates a presumption as an incident to a federal
cause of action " it should ordinarily be deemed applicable, unless a con-
trary intent appears, in the state courts as well as in the federal courts,
and in these circumstances whether the presumption is or is not outcome-
determinative is wholly irrelevant. In general the conclusions concerning
burden of proof are applicable here: not all presumptions need necessarily
53
.Id. at 372.
5 E.g., Smith v. Thompson, 349 Mo. 396, 161 S.W. 2d 232 (1942); cf.
American Railway Exp. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19 (1923). This is of course particularly
true where the state presumption is conclusive, as where a state statute makes
employment of a minor negligence per se. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Stapleton.
279 U.S. 587 (1929).
55 See Connor v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 189 Calif. 1, 207 P. 378 (1922);
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Grant, 223 Ky. 39, 2 S.W. 2d 1063 (1928); Manning v.
Chicago G.W. Ry., 135 Minn. 229, 160 N.W. 787 (1916). More recent cases have
clarified the role of res ipsa loquitur in FELA actions. See Jesionowski v. Boston
& Maine R.R., 329 U.S. 452 (1947) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948).
Another federal presumption which is developing and which presumably is binding
on the state courts is that the railroad employee is presumed to have exercised due
care. This presumption has been used in recent years to help establish the proposi-
tion that the negligence of the railroad was the proximate cause of the accident in
situations where there was no direct evidence as to how the accident occurred.
See Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 34 (1944); Stanford v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 171 F. 2d 632, 635 (3d Cir. 1948).
5G See Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R.R., supra note 55, at 457.
Zi6aLobel v. American Airlines, Inc. supra note 51; Hamilton v. Southern
Ry., supra note 51.
57 E.g., Section 15(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 676 (1938),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 215(b) (1952).
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be given outcome-determinative effect;5s the Erie precedents may furnish
a helpful analogy; and above all consideration should be given to the
demands of overriding federal policy.
Jury trial: In the conflict of laws the lex fori usually determines
whether there shall be a jury trial, 9 and this is so even where the right
to a jury trial on a particular issue is the subject of a constitutional
guaranty in the foreign locus.6" The Supreme Court has indicated,
moreover, that the abolition of jury trial altogether by a state would
not be a denial of due process. 6'
In theory, the outcome of a particular suit should not be materially
affected depending upon whether the trier of the facts is the court or a
jury; and if the outcome is materially affected it would seem to be in
consequence of human factors rather than variant "legal rules."62 Ac-
cordingly the federal district courts have almost uniformly applied
federal law in determining whether to grant a jury trial.6"
In early FELA cases, as will shortly be seen, the states were left to
follow their own procedure in the matter of jury trial. The more recent
cases, however, show an increasing tendency to compel the states to con-
duct jury trials in a manner substantially similar to the jury trials con-
ducted in the federal district courts. The only reference to jury trial in
the FELA is in Section 3,64 which has provided since the Act was first
adopted in 1908 that contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery
"but that the damages shall be'diminished by the jury in proportion to the
amount of negligence" attributable to the employee. This statutory
5 The term "presumption" is being used loosely in the text. Even if one
jurisdiction accepts the rule of another that the existence of B must be inferred
from the proof of A in the absenc of proof to the contrary, the question still
remains whether the first jurisdiction will borrow from the second its rules regard-
ing the precise burden placed by the presumption upon the non-favored party
and the precise degree of aid afforded by the presumption to the favored party
once the non-favored party produces rebutting evidence. See Ray, op. cit. supra
note 46, at 591-96. While the federal district courts have tended generally to
give outcome-determinative classification to "presumptions" it does not appear
that they have given adequate consideration to these important subsidiary prob-
lems.
3 RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcT OF LAws, Sec. 594 (1934).
6 0 Bourestom v. Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666, 673, 285 N.W. 426, 429 (1939);
Hopkins v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 41, 171 S.W. 2d 625 (1943).
61 Cf. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54 (1919).
62 "In essence, the intent of that decision [Erie R.R. v. Tompkins] was to
insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation
in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a state court." Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
63 See Note, State Trial Procedure and the Federal Courts: Evidence, Juries,
and Direrted Verdicts under the Erie Doctrine, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1516, 1521 n. 30
(1953).
6135 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 53 (1952).
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language has never been relied upon by the Supreme Court, nor even
mentioned by it, in cases dealing with the type of jury trials afforded by
the states. Since an action under the FIELA is, as has been noted,
essentially an action in negligence, it is the type of action for which a
jury trial must be provided in the federal courts by virtue of the Seventh
Amendment; thus Section 3 was not needed to guarantee a jury trial in
the federal courts, and need not be viewed as designed to guarantee a
jury trial in any court.
The original Act made no reference whatever to proceedings in
state courts. Thereafter at least one state court declined to exercise
jurisdiction in an FELA proceeding, which brought about a hasty amend-
ment in 1910 declaring that the jurisdiction of the federal courts "shall
be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states." 5 And the
next year the Supreme Court held that, even before the 1910 amend-
ment, causes of action arising under the FELA were enforcible as of
right in the state courts, emphasizing in this connection "that there was
not involved here any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the
jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect their modes of pro-
cedure . . ."" Shortly afterward the Supreme Court held that the states
were free in FELA cases to follow local procedures which permitted a
jury to reach a verdict by less than a unanimous decision, 67 or which
permitted a jury to be constituted with less than twelve persons.6 s To the
contention that that Seventh Amendment guaranteed a unanimous verdict
by a jury of twelve in controversies over federally-created rights regard-
less of whether such rights were asserted in federal or state tribunals,
the Supreme Court replied, in Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Bombolis,6 9
that the Seventh Amendment applied only to proceedings in the federal
courts, and that insofar as the state courts adjudicated claims derived
from federal law, as indeed they were bound to do when their jurisdic-
tion was properly invoked, they were free to do so "in accordance with
the modes of procedure prevailing in such courts," and that this more-
over was what Congress had contemplated in enacting the FELA.7 ° The
apparent implication, as recognized in later cases,71 was that the states
could dispense with jury trial entirely in FELA proceedings. It was also
6536 Stat. 291, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 56 (1952). The legislative history of this
amendment is discussed at some length in the majority and dissenting opinions
in Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942).
66 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 56 (1912).
67Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Stewart, 241 U.S. 261, 263 (1916).
68Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Carnahan, 241 U.S. 241, 242 (1916).
69241 U.S. 211 (1916).
70 241 U.S. 211 at 218.
71 Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.RL, 342 U.S. 359 (1952). Also see Brady v.
Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479 (1943). But cf. Blair v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
323 U.S. 600, 602 (1945).
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made clear in the early years of the Act that the states could follow their
own practice in the matter of special verdicts.7"
In 1943, in Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry.,73 the Court had before
it the question whether sufficient evidence of negligence had been adduced
to warrant submission of the case to the jury in a state FELA action.
This question was answered in the affirmative. But the Court also stated
gratuitously as follows:74
To withdraw such a question from the jury is to usurp its
functions. The right to trial by jury is a "basic and funda-
mental feature of our system of federal jurisdiction." Jacob v.
New York City, 315 U.S. 752. It is part and parcel of the
remedy afforded railroad workers under the Employers Lia-
bility Act.. . . To deprive these workers of the benefit of a
jury trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away a goodly
portion of the relief which Congress has afforded them.
The Bombolis case and its companion cases were not cited, and there
was no reference to the provision regarding jury trial in Section 3. The
Jacob case which was cited had been tried in a federal district court, and
it was a case moreover which arose under the Jones Act, which expressly
provides for a jury trial.7"
The dictum in Bailey was seemingly the most potent factor con-
tributing towards the result in Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R.76 There
it was held, in a five to four decision, that an Ohio court was not free
to follow a local rule which, while leaving the issue of negligence to the
jury, required the judge rather than the jury to decide whether there
had been fraud in inducing the execution of a release. Justice Black,
writing for the majority, quoted from Bailey to the effect that the right
to a jury trial is "part and parcel of the remedy" created by the FELA,
and, paraphrasing Bailey, stated that it was "too substantial a part of the
rights accorded by the Act to permit it to be classified as a mere 'local rule
of procedure.' ,M The Bombolis case, he said, "might be more in
point ' ' 78 had the state abolished jury trial entirely. Apart from the fact
that Bombolis itself did not involve an attempted abolition of jury trial,
it is difficult to understand the suggestion that complete abolition might
succeed although the exclusion of particular issues from the consideration
72 Compare Chicago & N.V. Ry. v. Gray, 237 U.S. 399 (1915) 'with Kansas
City S. Ry. v. Leslie, 238 U.S. 599, 603 (1915). But ef. Patton v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R., 197 F. 2d 732, 74445 (3d Cir. 1952). As to local autonomy in the
matter of the procedure to be followed when a party's requested instructions to
the jury are found to be improper, see Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Holloway,
246 U.S. 525 (1918).
73319 U.S. 350 (1943).
74 319 U.S. 350 at 354.
75 See note 80 infra.
76 342 U.S. 359 (1952) .The minority members concurred in the result while
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of the jury could not; and it is difficult to understand the reliance upon
the dictum in Bailey when the Court was now aware, as seemingly it
had not been in Bailey, that earlier decisions had gone far to establish the
autonomy of the states in the matter of jury trial.
Certain FELA cases not mentioned by Justice Black constitute, it
seems to the writer, stronger precedents supporting the result reached by
the majority. In these cases, which for reasons of convenience are dis-
cussed in a separate section below,7 9 the Court has in effect instructed the
states to follow federal rules concerning certain aspects of the allocation
of functions between court and jury; these cases are similar to Dice in
that they represent federal direction of the type of jury trial the states
must conduct in FELA cases. Whether the states may dispense with
jury trial altogether in such cases is a question which has not arisen,
and is not likely to arise, since the states customarily provide a jury trial
in negligence actions. Nor has there been considered in these FELA
cases the propriety as a constitutional question of federal legislative or
judicial compulsion upon the states to provide a jury trial in particular
instances, or, where jury trial is available under state law, to fashion the
jury trial upon the federal model."0
8 0 The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. Sec. 688 (1952), provides
that actions thereunder shall be with "right of trial by jury." Although the Act
is silent regarding possible proceedings in state courts, it was held at an early
date that the state courts had the same concurrent jurisdiction as under the
FELA. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1926). The impact upon the
states of the provision regarding jury trial has rarely arisen because, as in the
case of the FELA, a Jones Act proceeding is based essentially upon negligence,
and jury trials are accorded by the states as a matter of course.
However this aspect of the Jones Act was sharply in issue in 1947 in Hust
v. Moore-McCormack Co., 180 Ore. 409, 177 P. 2d 429 (1947). The Constitution
of Oregon, as construed by the Supreme Court of that state, provided that a
trial court was without power to set aside a jury verdict on the ground of
excessive damages, and gave the Supreme Court power, at least where error had
been committed in the trial, to direct judgment for such amount as seemed to it
warranted by the record. The state Supreme Court held that this constitutional
provision was inapplicable in a Jones Act case. The reasoning of the Court was
as follows: the provision in the Jones Act regarding jury trial contemplates a
jury trial as conducted at common law; at common law only the jury could fix
the amount of damages; and the right thus accorded by the Jones Act to have
the jury determine the damages is too clearly "substantive" in the light chiefly
of the FELA cases to be ignored by a state in favor of the local 'procedure."
However the Court gave no indication that it was prepared to follow all the
common law incidents of jury trial in cases arising under the Jones Act. Thus
the Court expressly left open the question whether the state might abolish jury
trial altogether in such cases, 180 Ore. at 419, 177 P. 2d at 434; and, more
interestingly, the Court cautioned that it was "not to be understood as suggesting
... that state law, such as we have in Oregon, prescribing that less than a unani-
mous jury may return a verdict or forbidding the court to comment on the evi-
dence, may not be applied in a trial under the Jones Act." 180 Ore. 409 at 429-30,
177 P. 2d at 438. As to what was to be done in the "novel circumstances" before
it, 180 Ore. at 434, 177 P. 2d at 440, the Court determined that the case
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If the holding in Dice is that the right to a jury trial in a state court
is "part and parcel" of the remedy created by the FELA solely because a
jury trial would be available if the same action were brought in a federal
district court, then the holding is one which invites broad applications,
not only in actions in the state courts on federally-created rights generally,
but also in actions in the federal district courts on state-created rights8 1 -
although following state jury practice in the federal district courts might
present serious constitutional problems. 2 Such broad applications have
not yet evidenced themselves in the inferior federal courts or in the
state courts.
In fact there are substantial reasons for limiting Dice to FELA
proceedings unless and until the Supreme Court indicates otherwise. The
express reference to jury trial in Section 3 of the Act affords a convenient
if not altogether convincing basis for the argument that Congress legis-
lated regarding the kind of jury trials the states must afford in FELA
cases. More persuasive however is the fact that Dice is essentially a
skirmish in a larger battle which has sharply divided the Court over the
role of the jury in FELA actions. Indeed some members of the Court
have charged in effect that the role of the jury as such has not been the
real issue in this struggle-the charge is that dissatisfaction over the
substantive provisions of the Act, which permit recovery for accidents in
this hazardous occupation only upon proof of negligence, has often
caused a majority of the Court, and not always the same majority, to
convert the Act into a vehicle of absolute liability by affording a maxi-
mum of leeway to juries, which are notoriously partial to maimed rail-
road workers and to the families of deceased railroad workers. 3 More-
over, some of the Justices who have been targets of these charges of
plaintiff-mindedness have been generally unsuccessful in attempts to
expand the role of the jury in other areas, but it must be observed that
the cases to which reference is made antedate the major new develop-
should be remanded to the trial court for determination whether a new trial
should be granted on the ground of excessive damages, despite the fact that the
state constitution denied such power to the trial court. The Court did not explore
the question whether this type of reorganization of the state judicial machinery
was really intended by Congress, or whether Congress could constitutionally
require such a reorganization. On the other hand the assumption that the United
States Supreme Court would insist that the damages be fixed by the jury found
some support in the tenor of the earlier opinion in Hust v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 328 U.S. 707 (1946), and of course was given strong vindication by the
later decision in the Dice case.
81 See the law review comments cited in note 9 supra.
82 Cf. Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
83 See, e.g., Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 358 (1943) ; Wil-
kerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 75-77 (1949); Stone v. New York, C. & St.
L. R.R., 344 U.S. 407, 410-11 (1953). Cf. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 196-97
(1949). Also see Note, Supreme Court Certiorari Policy in Cases Arising under
the FELA, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1441 (1956).
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ments on the FELA front.8 4 Finally, two members of the five-man
majority in Dice are no longer on the Court,"5 although the minority has
also lost a member.8 6 For all these reasons it is far from certain that a
majority of the Court would be inclined to extend the holding of Dice
into other areas, assuming the holding is as hypothesized above.
Allocation of functions between court and jury: The history of the
jury system is also the history of judicial efforts to prevent or quash jury
action thought to represent an abuse of the fact-finding function.8 7 One
device is to order a new trial on the ground that the verdict of the jury
is unreasonable; the old jury is in effect dismissed as incompetent and the
job of resolving the factual issues is assigned to a new jury. A more
drastic device is to take the fact-finding function from the jury altogether
by directing a verdict or by rendering a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Some jurisdictions are more liberal than others in the scope they
afford to jury action, or at least the verbal formulations of their attitudes
seem more liberal. In any event it is the lex fori which determines these
matters in the conflict of laws. 8 Whether the same matters are "outcome-
determinative" for Erie purposes has been the subject of some confusion
in the lower federal courts.89
The direction which has been taken in FELA cases has been more
definite, if not less confusing. However this development can best be
understood if preliminary attention is given to the distinction between
decisions which are concerned with the legal consequences of particular
facts and decisions which are concerned only with the methods by which
the facts are established.
There is obviously a federal interest (affording a basis for over-
riding of state judicial action) in whether, on a given record, recovery
shall be granted or denied to one claiming a federal right. Clearly this
interest extends to the minimum quantum of evidence the plaintiff must
adduce to prove a prime facie case; "only by a uniform rule as to the
necessary amount of evidence may litigants receive similar treatment in
all states."9" And this is so even though, upon the undisputed record,
84 See Comment, Federal Courts-Directed Ferdicts in Ci'vil Actions, 47
MIcH. L. REV, 974, 978 (1949).
8 5 Justice Minton and the late Chief Justice Vinson.
86 The late Justice Jackson.
87 See Smith, The Power of the Judge to Direct a Ferdict: Section 457-a of
the N.Y. Civil Practice Act, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1924); Blume, Origin and
De'velopment of the Directed Verdict, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 555 (1950).
88 Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof. 58 HARv. L. REV. 153, 159 et seq.
(1944).
80 See Note, op. cit. supra note 63, at 1523-25; Comment, Substance and
Procedure under the Doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 30 TEXAS L. REV.
600, 604 (1952); 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE Para. 38.10 (2d ed. 1951); Note,
Federal Trials and the Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 338, 347-51 (1956).
90 Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479 (1943). Also see Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472 (1926); *Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Hughes,
278 U.S. 231 (1929).
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the trier of the facts is free to infer the existence or non-existence of
negligence, for the concern here is with the minimum which the plaintiff
as a matter of law is required to prove. 1 When a prima face case has
been proved, but the material facts are disputed, resolution of the factual
issues is again a matter of federal interest, in the sense that the interest
in whether a claimed federal right is properly granted or denied can
hardly be less than the interest which created the right. If the Supreme
Court limits its review of factual issues in such cases it is not because a
federal interest is lacking but because the Court is functioning in its
appellate role, accepting in large measure the findings made by the trier
of the facts in the state courts, as it accepts those made by the trier of
the facts in the federal district courts, if there is a reasonable basis for
the findings.92 In its appellate role, the Supreme Court may hold that
on a particular state of facts one of the parties must win or that the
other party cannot win, irrespective of the findings made by the trier of
the facts, or the Court may hold that the record does not support a re-
quest for such a ruling.9" Insofar as the Court is determining that the
evidence overwhelmingly compels (or does not compel) a particular
result, the Court again is ruling on the legal consequences of facts and
not on the method by which the facts are initially determined.
In a number of cases where state trial judges or state appellate
courts gave peremptory rulings for the railroad, the Supreme Court has
reversed on the ground that the jury could reasonably have found either
way on the particular facts;9 4 in such cases the Court has often stated
that the resolution of "close or doubtful" questions is necessarily for the
jury.9" Since in these cases the Court is not holding that the record
compels a determination in favor of one party or the other--since a
determination either way would obviously be sustained if made in the
first instance by the jury-it would seem that the Court is directing the
states concerning the machinery they are to employ in resolving doubtful
questions. However the cases can and perhaps should be read in a
different sense-they can be taken as holdings that the Court will inter-
91 Compare the cases cited in note 94 infra.
92 Cf. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 585-86 (1943); Feiner v. New
York, 340 U .S. 315, 316 (1951). The statement in the text is only a rough gen-
eralization, for the approach of the Supreme Court to questions of fact often
presents complex problems. See HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 53945 (1953); ROBERTSON ANn KIRKHAM., JURISDICTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 191 et seq. WOLFSON & KURLAND ED.
(1951).
93E.g., Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332 (1942); Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
94Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Lavender v. Kurn,
327 U.S. 645 (1946) ; Ellis v. Union Pacific R.R. 329 U.S. 649 (1947); Wilkerson
v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949).
95]Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., supra note 94, at 354. Also see Lavender
v. Kurn, supra note 94, at 652-53; Wilkerson, v. McCarthy, supra note 94, at
61-64.
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vene when the normal operation of the existing state judicial machinery
has been distorted by a misconception concerning a federal question,
such as a mistaken view that not enough evidence of negligence has been
adduced, or a mistaken view that the evidence overwhelmingly compels
a particular result.9" Reading the cases in this light, what the Court is
saying is that as a matter of federal law a particular state of facts is
strong enough to support a determination for A or B, that it is not so
weak from A's point of view as to compel a determination for B, and
that proper enforcement of the FELA requires that the case be tried in
the state courts without any misconception on this point, for otherwise the
scales would be unfairly weighted against A." Thus the actual holdings
would seem to be not that the jury must determine a "close or doubtful"
question but only that the question is in fact "close or doubtful;" once
such a holding has been made the determination of the question in issue
by a jury follows as a matter of course under the usual state procedure.
However some recent FELA cases concerning directed verdict
practice cannot be rationalized in this manner. Preliminarily it should be
noted that there are two basic approaches as to when a directed verdict
(or judgment notwithstanding the verdict) should be granted. In a
number of states, and this is apparently the more traditional view, the
trial judge may direct a verdict upon consideration of only such evidence
as is favorable to the party against whom the verdict is sought.9" Thus if
the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case, these jurisdictions will not
allow a verdict to be directed against him irrespective of the weight of
the evidence on the defendant's side. If the jury returns a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, the Court will now weigh all the evidence, and
will set the verdict aside and order a new trial of it thinks the verdict
unreasonable. In such jurisdictions disagreement between court and jury
can lead to a succession of new trials.
It is the rule in a number of other jurisdictions, 99 and for a long
time it appeared to be the settled federal rule,1"0 that a verdict is to be
directed whenever the circumstances are such that a jury verdict for the
other party would necessarily have to be set aside-in other words, upon
consideration of all the evidence. Under this rule successive jury trials
96 Cf. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. De Atley, 241 U.S. 310, 316-18 (1916).
97Even when a state court denies a state-created right because of a mis-
conception on a point of federal law, there is a basis for federal judicial inter-
vention. E.g., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). On
the other hand, there does not appear to be a federal right to have the local
practice properly applied in the adjudication of federal claims, Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Holloway, 246 U.S. 525 (1918), as long as an opportunity is
in fact provided to present the federal claims.
989 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE Sec. 2494 (3d ed. 1940). Also see Smith, op. cit.
supra note 87, Blume, op. cit. supra note 87.
99 See WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 98, at Sec. 2494.
100 Comment, Federal Courts-Directed Verdicts in Civil Actions, 47 MICH.
L. REV. 974 (1949).
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are avoided. Although the Supreme Court has applied this rule in FELA
cases arising in the federal district courts..' it does not seem in the past to
have enforced the rule upon the state courts, and in general the state
courts followed their own practice in the matter of directed verdicts.0 2
It may be observed that, whatever may be the practical consequences, in
theory the final outcome of the litigation cannot be materially affected by
a procedure requiring successive jury trials, since the court is always un-
der a duty to set aside an unreasonable verdict."0 3 However in 1949,
speaking for the Court in a state FELA action, Justice Black said :104
"It is the established rule that in passing upon whether there is sufficient
evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need look only to the evidence
and reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of a litigant
against whom a peremptory instruction has been given." Justice Black
did not cite authorities, but the Court clearly did consider only one side
of the evidence in this and in a number of earlier FELA actions where
the question in issue was the propriety of a directed verdict or of a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.'0 5
As previously noted the Court in these and other decisions has been
particularly concerned that what it considers to be "close o" doubtful"
cases should not be taken from the jury. Indeed the Court in these cases
sometimes conveys the impression that a jury verdict supported by a
reasonable quantum of evidence on one side must necessarily stand ir-
respective of the weight of the evidence on the other-that even sub-
mission of the issue to a new jury is precluded; 0 6 but such indications
have never appeared in a context from which it could be said that the
lOlPennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933).
102 Cf. Brenizer v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 156 Tenn. 479, 3 S.W. 2d
1053 (1928); Dutton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 104- S.C. 16, 88 S.E. 263, 267
(1916), affirmed, 245 U.S. 637 (1918). Compare Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Holloway's Adm'r, 163 Ky. 125, 173 S.W. 343 (1915), 'with Louisville & Nashville
R. R. v. Grant, 234 Ky. 276, 27 S.V. 2d 980 (1930).
103 It is to be noted, however, that by law in some states the verdict ren-
dered after a third jury trial may not be set aside for unreasonableness. See
Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L. Ray. 153, 179-80 (1944) ;
22 TExAS L. REv. 359 (1944); Brenizer v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., supra note
102. In some states, moreover, a statute or constitutional provision decrees that
a particular issue, usually contributory negligence, must be submitted to the jury,
and that the jury's determination on this issue is conclusive. Cf. Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54 (1919); Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S.
91 (1931). The degree to which such provisions must be followed in state FELA
actions has not been determined by the Supreme Court
104 Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949).
105 Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943) ; Lavender v. Kurn,
327 U.S. 645 (1946).
100In Lavender v. Kurn, supra note 105, the fatal accident had not been
witnessed by anybody. The plaintiff introduced evidence intended to show that
the decedent had been struck by a hook protruding from a train, and in rebuttal
the railroad introduced evidence purportedly proving that such a cause was
"physically and mathematically impossible," 327 U.S. 645 at 652, and tending also
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Court knowingly intended such a radical departure from the basic rule
of trial procedure which requires the court to weigh all the evidence in
passing upon the reasonableness of the jury's verdict. At most, it seems
more reasonable to interpret this line of cases as making applicable, per-
haps only in FELA proceedings, the practice which prohibits a directed
verdict (or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict) even though a
contrary jury verdict would have to be set aside--a practice which, in
case of an unreasonable verdict, requires resubmission of the issues to
another jury. The necessity of holding a new trial, as an alternative to
peremptory disposition of the case by the judge, is of considerable practical
consequence-first, because of the notorious partiality of juries for the
plaintiff in FELA cases, -to which reference has already been made; and
second, because of the tendency of the courts to yield when successive
juries persist in being "unreasonable." 'l ° Yet even in this area one dis-
cerns only a vague insistence by the prevailing Justices that the traditional
functions of the jury shall be respected-there is little eiridence of aware-
ness of a distinct break with prior trial practice.' Thus, even if a new
rule concerning directed verdicts seems to be emerging from the FELA
cases, it is not clear at this time that it should be applied in other than
FELA cases, or possibly also in cases under related statutes like the Jones
Act."0 9 The increasing federal control over allocation of functions be-
tween court and jury in state FELA cases is an aspect of, and finds support
in, the growing tendency, discussed in the previous section, to hold
generally that the states must grant a federal-type jury trial in such cases.
Here as in the Dice situation a majority of the Justices may not be pre-
pared for an extension of a rule developed in the course of the struggle
over FELA liability. Certainly there has been no discernible expansion
to show that the decedent's death had been due to murder rather than to a railroad
accident. The state Supreme Court held that on this record the case should not
have been submitted to the jury. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
stating that the railroad's evidence was "irrelevant upon appeal, there being a
reasonable basis in the record for inferring that the hook struck Haney. 0 * 0
Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion
reached does a reversible error appear. But when, as here, there is an evidentiary
basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever
facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court's function is ex-
hausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that
the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more
reasonable" (emphasis supplied). 327 U.S. at 652-53.
Also see Note, Supreme Court Certiorari Policy in Cases Arisin. under the
FELI), 69 HARV. L. REv. 1441, 1447-50 (1956).
107 See Smith, op. cit. supra note 87, at 122-23.
108 See the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Wilkerson v. McCarthy,
336 U.S. 53, 70-71 (1949), and his dissenting opinion in Calmar Steampship Corp.
v. Scott, 345. U. S. 427, 444, N. 1 (1953).
109 The Jones Act incorporates the FELA by reference, giving seamen the
same remedy that railroad workers have under the FELA. Cf. Garrett v. Moore-




of this rule into new areas, even in the lower federal courts.11' And in
FELA cases in the lower federal courts and in the state courts there has
been, not unnaturally, much confusion.
1 12
Statutes of limitations: Statutes of limitations are procedural in the
conflict of laws on the theory that they represent local policies of repose
which are not intended to affect the "substantive" rights of the parties."13
In general, the forum will interpose its shorter statute of limitations to
bar a cause of action which is not barred in the foreign locus, and con-
versely the forum, in the absence of a "borrowing" statute, will give the
benefit of its longer statute of limitations to a cause of action which is
barred by the shorter limitations period of the foreign locus."14 On the
other hand, federal courts adjudicating state-created rights in cases of
diversity jurisdiction have been strictly enjoined to follow the statute of
limitations of the forum state in order to achieve the uniformity of out-
come demanded by the post-Erie line of cases.'1 5
When federally-created rights have been asserted in the state courts,
the latter, in the absence of an express federal statute of limitations, have
applied the local limitations rule as a matter of course.' 6 However, when
111 See cases collected at 10 Federal Digest Cum. Supp. Trial, Key no. 178
(1955) ; Comment op. cit. supra note 100 at 983.
112 E.g., Keith v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry., 160 F. 2d 654, 657-58 (6th Cir., 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 763 (1947); Barnett v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. L., 200 F.
2d 893, 896-97 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 956 (1953) ; Keiper v. North-
western Pac. R.R., 134 Cal. App. 2d 702, 286 P. 2d 47 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 948 (1956); Bowman v. Illinois Central R.R., 9 Ill. App. 2d 182, 132 N.E.
2d 558, 569 (1956); August v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 265 S.W. 2d 143, 153 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954). Also see Comment, op. cit. supra note 100, at 982-93.
113 Cf. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
114 STtUMaERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 147,52 (2d 1951).
115 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953) ; Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 109 (1945). An independent basis for doing so may be
found in the procedural history of the Rules of Decision Act. See Hill, State
Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HAav. L. REV. 66, 78-81
(195S).
116 See cases cited in HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEM 476 (1953). Even where a statute has been construed broadly
as a federal pre-emption of the area in which it is operative, the pre-emption
is ordinarily not deemed to extend to local "procedural" matters, see e.g., Dickenson
v. Stiles, 246 U.S. 631 (1918), which ordinarily include statutes of limitations.
There is a considerable reluctance to leave an area uncontrolled by any limitations
period whatever, which has been largely responsible for making state statutes of
limitations applicable even in the federal district courts. See Hill, op. cit. supra
note 115, at 79-80. Conceivably, however, a federal "substantive" right claimed
in a state court may be hostile to the spirit of a local limitations rule, particularly
where the local rule is one of laches, since the latter may represent more a policy
of estoppel than a policy of repose. Cf. Utley v. City of St. Petersburg, 292 U.S.
106 (1934). In some circumstances the facts which bring into existence an estoppel
may clearly constitute a basis for the denial of relief on independent state grounds.
E.g., Enterprise Irrig. Dist. v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917).
In other circumstances the area in which an estoppel is claimed may be one which
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Congress qualifies a federally-created right by a specific limitations period
intended to be operative in all courts, it is so operative by reason of the
paramountcy of federal law, and analysis in terms of whether or not it is
procedural, or whether or not it is outcome-determinative, is simply
irrelevant." 7 An illustration is afforded by the decision in Engel v.
Davenport."'. The Jones Act," 9 under which this case arose, incorpo-
rated by reference the then two-year statute of limitations of the FELA.
When, as in this instance, a statute creating a right of recovery also con-
tains a specific limitations period, the latter is usually given substantive
effect in the conflict of laws as establishing a condition precedent to re-
covery which cannot be evaded by resort to a state with a longer statute
of limitations. 120 However some states will deny recovery even in these
cases if the local statute of limitations is shorter.12 ' And in California,
where this Jones Act case arose, it was assumed that conflict of laws prin-
ciples were applicable and that the action was barred by the one-year
statute of limitations of the forum. 2 2 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding in effect that the probable intention of Congress to ensure "uni-
formity of operation,"'' 2  a consideration of more than ordinary signifi-
cance in admiralty legislation, 124 required the federal statute of limitations
to be followed in the state Courts as well as in the federal courts. The
paramount effect of the same federal statute of limitations in state FELA
cases had been established at an earlier date.'2 5
It has long been clear that whether a cause of action has been com-
menced within the period of limitation set forth in the FELA is ordinarily
a federal question, involving the construction of the federal statute.1 26
A parallel development in the Erie line of cases is worth noting, if only
because it illustrates clearly that the policy considerations operative at the
is pre-empted by federal law. Cf. MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co.,
329 U.S. 402 (1947).
117 In holding the then two-year statute of limitations set forth in the FELA
to be binding upon the state courts, Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme
Court, said: "In dealing with the enactments of a paramount authority, such as
Congress is, within its sphere, over the States, we are not to be curious in nomen-
clature if Congress has made its will plain, nor to allow substantive rights to be
impaired under the name of procedure." Atlantic Coast Line R.RL v. Burnette,
239 U.S. 199, 201 (1915).
118271 U.S. 33 (1920).
119 See note 80 supra.
120 GOODRICH, CNFLIcr OF LAws 243-44 (3d ed. 1949).
121 Id.
122 See the opinion of the State Supreme Court in 194 Cal. 344, 288 P. 710
(1924).
123 271 U.S. at 39.
124 Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
125 See note 117 supra.
126Reading v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58 (1926); Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S. 77




federal and state levels are not identical. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co.,22 7 the Kansas statute of limitations was concededly
applicable in a diversity case instituted in the United States District Court
for Kansas, and the question was whether ,the action had been instituted
within the two-year period set forth in the Kansas statute. Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a civil action is com-
menced by the filing of a complaint with the court, and the complaint
had in fact been filed within the two-year period. However the Kansas
statute provides that an action is not to be deemed commenced until the
service of the summons, and in this instance the summons had been served
after termination of the two-year period. The Supreme Court held that
the Kansas practice should be followed, chiefly on the basis of the so-called
Erie policy of enforcing state-created rights substantially. in the same
way they would be enforced in the courts of the forum state. The Court
did not attempt to accommodate and apparently did not even consider the
demands of the competing policy of federal procedural uniformity em-
bodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,12 8 nor did the Court
examine the question whether the Ere rule of uniformity required ex-
tension to an area where differences between federal and state law of a
procedural character could not reasonably be supposed to afford a basis
for forum-shopping--an area where what had appeared for a time to be
the raison d tre of cases like Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 29 was there-
fore inoperative. 3 ' These considerations are of course not applicable at
the state level, where the primary problem is to ascertain the demands of
paramount federal law, and the demands of state policy are irrelevant
save perhaps in the practical sense that the stronger the local policy the
more it will ordinarily take to persuade the courts that federal law over-
rides it.
The statute of limitations is similarly involved when the plaintiff
seeks to amend the complaint after the statutory period has expired.
When and in what circumstances this constitutes the institution of a new
action which is barred by the statute has been held to be a matter of
federal law binding upon a state court in an FELA proceeding.
1 3
127337 U.S. 530 (1949).
128 See Hill, op. cit. supra note 115, at 95.
129 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
130Cf. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM L.
REv. 489, 512-13 (1954); Blume and George, Limitations and the Federal Courts,
49 Micn. L. REv. 937, 953, 955-56 (1951).
131 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 241 U.S. 290 (1916). The seemingly
contrary implication of Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 224 U.S. 268 (1912),
must be deemed overruled by the later decision in the Seaboard Air Line case.
However state courts have been upheld by the Supreme Court when they
have disallowed amendments on state grounds other than statutes of limitations,
as where local procedural rules designed to insure fairness and to prevent sur-
prise have been deemed to bar such amendments. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Mims, 242 U.S. 532 (1917); Nevada-Calif.-Oreg.-Ry. v. Burrus, 244 U.S. 103
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Whether the federal courts are compelled in a corresponding manner to
follow state "relation back" rules in diversity cases has been the subject of
conflicting decisions by the lower federal courts.132 For the reasons al-
ready stated, the problems on the state level are not identical with those
on the federal level, whatever the impact of the Ragan case may be in
this area.
Manner of raising a federal question: Although the adequacy with
which a pleading in a state court asserts a federally-created right is a
federal question,'3" it is usually taken for granted that the pleading must
conform with the requirements of local procedure.' It is also clear
that a state may not defeat a federal right under the guise of rules of
procedure which in effect prevent an adjudication of the federal
question. 13
5
That these rules are easier to state than to apply is illustrated by the
decision of the Court in Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama. 8  The
Georgia courts had sustained a demurrer to a complaint under the FELA
on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. The complaint had
averred that the railroad had been negligent in allowing clinkers and
other debris to collect in its yards, and that the plaintiff had been injured
when he stepped upon a clinker; the complaint did not allege negligence
in the position of the particular clinker that caused the accident, and this
omission was apparently the essential basis for -the holding by the Georgia
Court of Appeals.' The Supreme Court, by Justice Black, held that
(1917). In the absence of federal occupation of such procedural areas it is
reasonable that they should be deemed to be governed by state law.
132Blume and George, op. cit. supra note 130, at 957-59.
133 Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923); First Nat. Bank of Guthrie
Center v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 346 (1926).
134 HART AND WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 116, at 499-504. Also see note
131 supra.
185An illustrative case is Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904), where
the state court had struck from its files as "unnecessarily prolix" under local
law a two-page motion by the defendant in a murder case raising the objection
that the exclusion of negroes from the grand jury violated his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Also see New York Central R.R. v. New York & Penn
Co., 271 U.S. 124 (1926) ; National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Brahan, 193 U.S.
635 (1904); Davis v. Wechsler, supra note 133. Presumably the federal Con-
stitution prevents a state from employing similar devices to bar consideration of
the law of another state when that law is clearly applicable under settled
principles of the conflict of laws. Cf. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates,
299 U.S. 178 (1936).
136338 U.S. 294 (1949).
137 The Georgia court also expressed the view that it was inferable from
the allegations that the proximate cause of the accident was the plaintiff's own
negligence, but the court showed an awareness that contributory negligence is
not an absolute bar to recovery under the FELA, and it is clear from the opinion
that the demurrer would have been overruled if there had been an adequate
allegation of the defendant's negligence. See 77 Ga. App. 780, 49 S.E. 2d 833
(1948).
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the complaint did "set forth a cause of action" 138 under the FELA,
and declared:139
Strict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unneces-
sary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal
laws . . Should -this Court fail to protect federally created
rights from dismissal because of over-exacting local require-
ments for meticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity in ad-
judication of federally created rights could not be achieved.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter, in which Justice Jackson
concurred, took the view that the demurrer had been properly sustained
for failure to follow local practice. Justice Frankfurter observed that
the Georgia courts were enforcing in this case, as in all other cases, "a
local requirement of pleading"' 4 that reflected "something of the per-
snicketiness with which seventeenth century common law read a plead-
ing,,,)41 but he concluded that this did not amount to a denial or a
limitation of the claimed federal right-in this connection he seemed
particularly impressed by the fact that the plaintiff, on notice of the
objections raised by .the demurrer, had had ample opportunity under
Georgia law to amend his complaint "in order to satisfy elegancies of
pleading ' 142 required by the local procedure. Actually Brown's failure
to amend his complaint is only one of several factors which suggests that,
whatever the troubles he may have encountered in the state courts, they
were not due to excessively burdensome pleading rules as such. 4 3
The proposition, often stated, that the sufficiency of pleadings as-
serting a federal right is itself a federal question would seem to suggest
that the degree of particularity required under state law is simply ir-
138 338 U.S. 294 at 297.
139 Id. at 298-99.
14 0 Id. at 301.
1411d. at 303.
14 2 d. at 301.
143 If a "strict" pleading jurisdiction requires more particularized allegations
than a "liberal" pleading jurisdiction, it does not follow that the two jurisdictions
differ with respect to the minimum quantum of proof necessary to establish a prima
facie case (the latter being a federal question.) Presumably it would have been
easy for Brown to amend his complaint to set forth the more particularized alle-
gations, but this would have been improvident if these allegations would have
been difficult of proof and if as a matter of law he really did not have to adduce
such proof to win. Interestingly enough, Justice Black's opinion, after reciting
certain factual allegations which did appear in the complaint, stated that
"the foregoing if proven would show an injury of the precise kind for which
Congress has provided a recovery." 338 U.S. 294. This would suggest that the
problem below was not the local pleading rules as such but rather a misconception
concerning the minimum quantum of evidence needed in an FELA case, which
was reflected in the local pleading rules only because the latter required highly
particularized allegations. However, Justice Black's opinion is not articulated in
these terms. As indicated in the text, the opinion seems to proceed from the
assumption that Brown had been prejudiced by pitfalls in the local pleading
procedure.
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relevant-indeed it is arguable from this proposition that a pleading
asserting a federal right which would be deemed adequate in a federal
district court under the extremely liberal provisions of Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be deemed an adequate assertion
of the federal right in a state court. But the Supreme Court has never
so held. In fact, subsequent to Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama the
Court upheld, as resting on an adequate state ground, the refusal by a
state court to consider certain claims raised under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for the reason that the supporting allegation was "conclusory"
under -the state practice. 44 Thus the question of the adequacy of the
allegations by federal standards is apparently not even reached unless
there has been compliance with all reasonable pleading requirements of
the states, such as the local rules regarding joinder of parties and causes
of action, 145 and, presumably, a requirement that a complaint be verified.
Apparently a local requirement of particularity in factual allegations is
also to be followed if not "over-exacting."
146
The qualification is a significant one, because in former years quali-
fications of this sort have been relatively unknown; that is to say, the
Supreme Court has generally refused to consider claims of federal right
in state judicial proceedings without full compliance with state procedure
as long as some sort of procedure did in fact exist for raising the federal
question, however burdensome or frustrating it might be'---a notoriously
troublesome area being post-conviction procedure in criminal cases.148
The overriding of state procedure is perhaps easier or simpler to justify
in the matter of the adequacy of a pleading than in such matters as
technical rules governing the type of writ or motion by which a particular
144 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311, n. 7 (1952). In a dissenting opinion
in this case Justice Frankfurter indicated that he construed the Brown decision
as a holding that federal claims cannot be barred because the supporting allega-
tions run afoul of state rules forbidding conclusory pleading, 343 U.S. at 322
n. 1, but the Justice was alone on this point. Cf. Ellis v Dixon, 349 U.S. 458
(1955).
14 5 Lee v. Central of Georgia Ry., 252 U.S. 109 (1926).
146Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, supra note 136, at 295.
147 See HART AND WECHSLER, Op. cit. supra note 116, at 492-517. However
it is uncertain that the Court would take the view today that a state is free to
make an unsuccessful appeal "costly", see Louisville & Nashville R.R_ v. Stewart,
241 U.S. 261, 263 (1916), when it is only by the process of appeal that federal
review may be had of federal questions. In the last cited case, which was an
FELA action, the Court upheld a state statute imposing a ten per cent penalty
upon a party who obtains a supersedeas and then loses on appeal. The right of
appeal may in many cases be illusory if the judgment cannot be stayed. On the
other hand the statutory penalty in the Stewart case was apparently in lieu of
interest on the judgment, see 241 U.S. at 263, and was not unreasonable in the
circumstances.
148 E.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Herndon v. Georgia, 295




question may be raised in the state courts. In any event there is no
indication in the Brown case that the Court considered the possibility of
rejecting what it conceives to be burdensome state procedures in these
larger areas, or the implications of such a move; and in fact the Brown
case has had no such wider impact as yet.
If the "over-exacting" pleading rules of Georgia had been applied
in respect of a cause of action arising under the laws of another state,
it is hardly likely that the Supreme Court would have found in the
Georgia rules as thus applied a transgression against the Full Faith and
Credit Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. Apart from the theoretical
difficulties posed by the latitudinarian approach in this area in the past,
the feasibility and desirability of such a decision would raise questions
of a somewhat different order from those involved where the issue is the
effective enforcement of paramount federal law. Again, it is doubtful
that the Brown case furnishes a helpful analogy in situations where the
so-called Erie principle applies. If the states set seventeenth century-type
pitfalls which take a substantial toll of unwary litigants, it is hardly
likely that the current emphasis on uniformity of outcome requires the
federal district courts sitting in those states to do likewise; and here too
there is no indication that the holding of the Brown case has been thought
to require such results. 50
Venue and forum non conveniens: It has been held that the venue
provisions in the Jones Act were intended to apply only in respect of
actions in the federal courts, and that the states are free to apply their
own venue requirements in cases arising under that Act.' 5 ' Presumably
this is also true of the FELA.' 52  However a federal venue provision
which is intended to be applicable in the state courts overrides any con-
trary state rule, at least insofar as it says there shall be no venue in a
situation where state law says there shall;' 5 3 it is far from certain that
federal law many confer venue in a state litigation when there is none
110 It is to be emphasized that "strict" and "liberal" pleading rules reflect
different concepts concerning the functions the pleadings are to serve in such
matters as adequacy of notice and definition of the factual issues; they do not
of themselves betoken varying concepts concerning the ingredients of a cause of
action or the degree of proof required to establish a prima facie case. See note
143 supra.
101 Bainbridge v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278 (1932).
15 2 See Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 703 (1942). But cf.
Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 345 U.S. 379, 380, 383 (1953).
103 Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. v. Journey, 257 U.S. 111 (1921) (suit against
federal Director General of Railroads) ; Davis v. Weehsler, 263 U. S. 22 (1923)
(same). Similarly, while a state, in non-federal matters, may treat a special
appearance to raise objections concerning venue and service as in effect a
general appearance and a corresponding waiver of all the objections that are
waived by a general appearance, cf. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890), it cannot
in this manner defeat such defenses when they have their origin in federal law.
Davis v. Wechsler, supra note 133; Michigan Central R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S
492 (1929).
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under state law.154 The Supreme Court has held too that a court of
state A may not enjoin a person, on grounds of inequity or hardship,
from prosecuting an FELA action in a court in state B where the suit in
state B was consistent with the venue provision of the FELA; whether
or not the local venue law of state B was satisfied in these situations was
not in issue in these cases and was not discussed by the Court.1 55
However it has also been held that a state court in which an FELA
suit is brought may decline to exercise jurisdiction at the behest of a
non-resident plaintiff who complains of conduct which took place outside
the state,1" 6 and may decline on forum non conveniens grounds gen-
erally. 57 In recognizing this freedom to refuse to entertain jurisdiction
in appropriate cases, the Supreme Court has emphasized that Congress
has never actually ordered the state Courts to take jurisdiction in FELA
cases.1 58 Whether Congress may actually compel the state Courts to
exercise jurisdiction is a difficult constitutional question which has never
been decided, but as a practical matter it must be recognized that even
without such a directive the power of the states to decline jurisdiction in
such matters is exceedingly limited and probably does not exist at all in
FELA cases.159
154 Cf. Bainbridge v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., supra note 150, at
280-81.
155 Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., supra note 151; Pope v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., supra note 152. These cases may be taken to mean that state A is
powerless to interfere by virtue of a paramount federal policy-they cannot be
taken as holdings that venue must lie in state B although unavailable under
local law.
156Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
157 Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
158 Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., supra note 156, at 388; Missouri
ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfiefild, supra note 157, at 5.
159Just as the states are obliged to give effect to legal rights created by
other states, Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); First Nat. Bank of Chicago
v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952), so they are obliged, even without a
Congressional directive, to give effect to legal rights created by federal law.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876); Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 56-59 (1912); McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230
(1934). The duty to do so in the case of state-created rights may be modified
by considerations of local policy. The duty to give effect to federally-created rights
may not be modified by considerations of local policy, Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (1947), except-and it is difficult to think of other exceptions-a policy based
not upon "the source of the law sought to be enforced," McKnett v. St. Louis
& S. F. Ry. supra, at 234, but upon a reluctance to allow out-of-state causes of
action to be tried in the local courts in the circumstances indicated in the text.
The state courts, as indicated in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, at
57, are obliged to adjudicate federal claims (and, it may be added, those created
by other states) when their jurisdiction is "appropriate to the occasion." But
this means their "ordinary jurisdiction," McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., supra
at 233, or their "general jurisdiction," Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643
(1935), which may not be the same thing as their jurisdiction as set forth by local
statute-for the states may not evade their "constitutional obligation" to accept
STATE FELA ACTIONS
Here again the permissible practice on the state level does not afford
a helpful analogy for determining the law that should govern the federal
district courts in diversity cases. Thus the federal district courts have
followed the federal venue statutes as a matter of course without regard
to the venue statutes of the states.' 0 As for forum non conveniens, this
practice has been superseded in the federal district courts by Section
1404(a) of the Judicial Code... which, in lieu of dismissal, provides for
transfer to a more convenient forum without the type of strong showing
formerly required concerning the inconvenience of the original forum. 162
The problem now is to strike an accommodation between the policy of
this statute and the Erie policy of uniformity with -the outcome in the
forum state, a major subsidiary problem being whether the result is to be
fashioned in the light of the probable outcome in the original or in the
transferee forum. 6 '
Other "procedural" areas; the Erie analogy considered further;
constitutional problems: In Dickenson v. Stiles64 the Court sustained the
applicability in a state FELA action of a state statute giving an attorney
a lien upon the cause of action, enforcible in a direct suit against the rail-
road. The opinion, by Justice Holmes, was to the general effect that the
federal statute did not occupy this particular area-that in permitting
suits in the state courts Congress must have contemplated the application
of the "ordinary incidents of state procedure,"' 65 of which the statute in
question was one because it dealt "only with a necessary expense of re-
covery." '6 There may be situations, however, when state-created liens
upon a federal cause of action are inconsistent with the broad purposes
of the statute creating the cause of action.' 7
Another case of special interest is Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M.
Ry. v. Taylor,'6 8 which arose under the Carmack Amendment, providing
for suits against carriers for property loss or damage.' In this case the
Court upheld a state assertion of jurisdiction based solely upon attach-
jurisdiction "by the simple device of removing jurisdiction from courts other-
wise competent." Hughes v. Fetter, supra at 611. It is probably safe to conclude
that if the state courts have jurisdiction in ordinary negligence actions, or in
actions for damages based upon violation of a statutory duty, they are
powerless to decline jurisdiction in FELA litigation. Cf. McKnett v. St. Louis &
S.F. Ry., supra.
160 See cases cited following 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1-391 (1950).
16123 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1952).
162 Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
163 See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHi. L. REV.
405 (195$).
164246 U.S. 631 (1918).
105 Id. at 633.
10 0 Id. at 632.
167 Cf. NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F. 2d 757 (9th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 312 U.S. 678 (1941).
108266 U.S. 200 (1924).
16934 Stat. 593 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20(11) (1952).
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ment, even though jurisdiction could not have been obtained in a federal
district court sitting in the same state because jurisdiction by attachment is
generally unavailable in the federal district courts and because other
possible bases of jurisdiction were lacking. Justice Brandeis, writing for
the Court, stated: "The grant of concurrent jurisdiction implies that,
in the first instance, the plaintiff shall have the choice of the Court. As
an incident, he is entitled to whatever remedial advantage inheres in the
particular forum." ' ° But he added that "no particularity of state pro-
cedure will be permitted to enlarge a substantive federal right,"'1 1 citing
cases involving burden of proof,172 presumptions,' and statute of limita-
tions, 1 4 which is to say that certain rules which the states regard as
"procedural" and which they may continue to so regard for conflict of
laws purposes must be regarded as "substantive" for other purposes, for
reasons which have already been pursued at some length.1 5
It is not clear whether a federal district court in a diversity situation
would assume jurisdiction in a case where jurisdiction cannot be obtained
under the law of the forum state. 17 6 However, it is apparent that in
many other respects the plaintiff does pursue "whatever remedial ad-
vantage inheres in the particular forum," and this is true on the federal
level as well as on the state level. Thus the plaintiff (or in many cases
the defendant, through removal to a federal court) may be expected to
choose the forum with the more favorable rule concerning joinder of
parties and causes, election of remedies, jury or non-jury trial, and dis-
covery procedure. As a matter of fact, the successful manoeuvering of a
case onto a trial docket which is or is not congested can have obvious
practical consequences, not the least of which is the effect on the prospect
of settlement. If the issues involved are in a sense often issues of "judicial
housekeeping,"' 177 and if the outcome of the litigation is not determined
with finality as it is in the case of a "door-dosing" rule,1 8 the fact is
170 266 U.S. 200 at 208.
171 Id. at 209.
172 Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
173 New Orleans & N. R-R. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367 (1918); Yazoovv
Mississippi Valley R.R., 249 U.S. 531 (1919).
174 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199 (1915).
175 For other collections of cases on the substance-procedure dichotomy in
state FELA litigation see Annotations, 12 A.L.R. 693 (1921); 36 A.L.R. 917
(1925); 96 Lawyers' Edition 408 (1952). Also see 33 YALE L. J. 308 (1924);
2 STAN. L. REV. 594 (1950); 21 TENN. L. REV. 324 (1950); 28 TExAS L. Rv.
972 (1950); 50 COLUM. L. REv. 385 (1950); 30 CHI-KENT L. Rv. 364 (1952);
37 CORNELL L. Q. 799 (1952).
176 See, e.g., Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts over Foreign Cor-
porations, 69 HARV. L. REv. 508, 522-24 (1956).
177 SeeNote, State Trial Procedure and the Federal Courts: Evidence, Juries
and Directed Verdicts Under the Erie Doctrine, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1516 (1953).
178 See HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEoERAL SYSTEM
668-78 (1953) ; Stewart, The Federal "Door-Closing" Doctrine, 11 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 154 (1954).
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that as a practical matter the outcome may sometimes be affected no
less by these "remedial advantages" than it is by rules governing pre-
sumption and burden of proof--and these "remedial advantages" more-
over are often discernible in advance and constitute perhaps a more
potent influence on forum-shopping than the influences which the Supreme
Court has eliminated in the line of cases beginning with Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Mfg. Co.' Yet there is an obvious difference between, on the
one hand, giving "substantive" classification to some key rules which are
conveniently ascertainable and sharp in their impact on the conduct of a
lawsuit, and, on the other, carrying this process to the point where the
distinction between the federal and state courts is more or less obliterated.
Moreover, if Congress may be presumed to have intended a uniform
application of the FELA, this does not completely gainsay Justice Holmes'
point that in expressly recognizing the concurrent jurisdiction of the state
courts Congress must be presumed to have contemplated that the "ordi-
nary incidents of state procedure" 80 would apply.
Finally, the constitutional problems on the federal and state levels
are dissimilar. The constitutional limits if any to the supervision which
the Supreme Court may exercise over the inferior federal courts are
murky indeed.18 ' Essentially different is the question whether the ma-
chinery of state government is being remolded for federal purposes insofar
as the state courts, in the exercise of a jurisdiction which they ordinarily
have no power to decline, are compelled to conduct themselves in all
substantial respects as if they were federal courts down to matters of
internal organization and division of functions. This question and its
constitutional implications have received relatively little consideration
from the Supreme Court, and it is not proposed to pursue the matter
here.' ' It is suggested only that the basic postulates of our federalism
may preclude federal action to draw the line between substance and
procedure at exactly the same place in the two different systems of courts.
Conclusion
It is evident that insofar as the state courts give effect to federally-
created rights, the Supreme Court has been enforcing, particularly in
FELA cases, a new demarcation of the line between substance and
procedure. In earlier opinions the customary explanation of the Court
179313 U.S. 487 (1941).
180 See note 165 supra. This is apart from the fact that, since 1911, FELA
actions instituted in the state courts have not been removable to a federal district
court, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1445 (1948). This provision against removal does not appear
to have significantly affected the action of the Supreme Court save in the venue
cases. E.g., Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R, supra note 152.
1s1 Compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) with Volf v. Col-
orado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
182 Cf Bainbridge v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278, 280
(1932); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), and the
cases cited in note I59 supra. Cf. note 80 supra.
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was that the states had erred in giving a procedural classification to
matters which were really "substantive." In more recent cases the Court
has shown increasing awareness that the familiar substance-procedure
dichotomy of the conflict of laws has been largely abandoned in such
cases, and that the new development corresponds largely to the develop-
ment that has been taking place in the federal district courts under
guidance of the post-Erie line of cases."' 3 And in general it is un-
doubtedly desirable that a state court should give effect to federally-
created rights sibstantially as a federal district court would, just as it is
desirable that a federal district court should give effect to state-created
rights in substantially the same way as the courts of the state in which
it sits--at least where the operative facts transpired within that state.
Insofar as the decisions in these two areas both tend towards the same
objective of uniformity of result, each area can serve as a source of
precedents and analogies which may be useful for the solution of prob-
lems in the other.
On the other hand certain significant differences between the various
forces and policies which are operative in the two areas bespeak the need
for a cautious approach to this problem. If the Erie development is the
more recent of the two, it is also the more consciously oriented. On the
state level the Supreme Court has neither articulated nor evidenced the
single-minded pursuit of a goal that is so conspicuous of ,the post-ErLe
cases starting with Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co.1 At least one good
reason for this is that on the state level the problem is complicated by the
18 In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 24-5 (1942), where
a state court was reversed for applying a local rule of burden of proof in an action
arising under the Jones Act and also under the general maritime law, justice
Black, writing for a unanimous Court, stated as follows:
If by its practice the state court were permitted substantially to alter
the rights of either litigant, as those rights were established in federal
law, the remedy afforded by the State would not enforce, but would ac-
tually deny, federal rights which Congress, by providing alternative rem-
edies, intended to make not less but more secure. The constant objective of
legislation and jurisprudence is to assure litigants full protection for all
substantive rights intended to be afforded them by the jurisdiction in
which the right itself originates. Not so long ago we sought to achieve
this result with respect to enforcement in the federal courts of rights
created or governed by state law" [citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins].
This was before the landmark decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945), but the new direction had already been charted in such cases as
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 497 (1941), and Cities Service Co. v.
Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
In Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 301 (1949) (dissenting
opinion), Justice Frankfurter was evidently prepared to apply the outcome-
determinatv'e standard of the Erie case generally in actions in the state courts to
enforce federally-created rights; his objection was that the majority was going
even further in this FELA case than the Erie standard contemplated. Also see
the majority opinion at 338 U.S. 296.
184 Supra note 183.
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need to give effect to the peculiar purposes of the paramount federal
interest being vindicated and to all valid manifestations of Congressional
intent, which militates against a uniform classification of substance and
procedure. For this reason among others there are grounds for doubting
that some of the trends which have been observed in the FELA cases
will be extended to other situations where state courts enforce federally-
created rights.
